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CHAPTER 5 
WORKING MEMORY LOAD ELICITS ATTENTIONAL BIAS TO 
THREAT 
 
Robert W. Booth1 & Dinkar Sharma2 




Anxious individuals tend to show attentional bias to threats and dangers; this is usually in-
terpreted as a specific bias in threat-processing. However, they also tend to show general 
working memory and cognitive control impairments. We hypothesised that the lack of work-
ing memory resources might contribute to attentional bias, by limiting anxious individuals’ 
ability to regulate their responses to emotional stimuli. If this is true, then loading working 
memory should elicit attentional bias to threat, even in non-anxious participants. We tested 
this hypothesis in two experiments, with participants unselected for anxiety. In Experiment 1, 
a phonological working memory load (remembering a string of digits) elicited an attentional 
bias to fear-conditioned Japanese words. In Experiment 2, a visuo-spatial working memory 
load (remembering a series of locations in a matrix of squares) elicited an attentional bias to 
emotional schematic faces. Results suggest that working memory and cognitive control may 
moderate the attentional bias to threat commonly observed in anxiety. 
Introduction 
Anxious individuals often show attentional bias toward threat (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007). This is typically measured in the dot-probe 
task (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986), in which participants are presented with one nega-
tive/threat and one neutral stimulus, followed by a probe. Anxious participants tend to respond 
faster when the probe appears in the threat stimulus’ location, compared to when it appears in 
the non-threat stimulus’ location. This is assumed to reflect some difference in the way anx-
ious people process and/or respond to threats (e.g., Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Williams, 
Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). Indeed, this assumption underpins cognitive bias modi-
fication, a currently-developing family of treatments for anxiety and depression (e.g., Hallion 
& Ruscio, 2011). However, anxious participants also tend to show a general deficit in working 
memory (WM) and cognitive control (e.g., Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001; Crowe, Matthews, & 
Walkenhorst, 2007). For example, anxious participants perform more poorly in dual-task sit-
uations than do non-anxious participants (Calvo & Eysenck, 1996; Derakshan & Eysenck, 
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1998), and seem to be particularly impaired on tasks requiring inhibitory processing or shifting 
between mental sets (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007).  
Recent work suggests that WM, aside from cognitive control, also contributes to emotion 
regulation (see Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008; Ochsner, Bunge, 
Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002, for similar arguments). For example, Schmeichel (2007)  has found 
that regulating responses to an unpleasant video reduced available WM resources, and that 
participants with higher WM capacities could better regulate emotional responses 
(Schmeichel, Volokhov, & Demaree, 2008). As a result of their low WM capacity, anxious 
individuals may therefore experience threats as more severe than do non-anxious individuals, 
which would tend to exacerbate attentional bias (Wilson & MacLeod, 2003). If correct, this 
implies two  related conjectures: firstly, that differences in attentional bias may be partially 
attributable to differences in WM rather than differences in threat processing per se (Eysenck 
et al., 2007; Ouimet, Gawronski, & Dozois, 2009); and secondly, that loading WM should 
increase attentional bias. Although previous studies looking for a link between processing of 
emotional stimuli and WM or cognitive control have yielded contradictory results (Schmeichel 
et al., 2008; Van Dillen & Derks, 2012; Van Dillen, Heslenfield, & Koole, 2009), we do not 
know of previous studies which have examined WM load’s effects on attentional bias in the 
dot probe task.  
To see whether WM capacity is partially responsible for attentional bias to threat in anxious 
individuals, we measured bias under high and low WM load. In Experiment 1, we used fear-
conditioned Japanese characters as threat stimuli (Van Damme, Crombez, Hermans, Koster, & 
Eccleston, 2006), to avoid visual or lexical artefacts. Participants were unselected for anxiety, 




Participants. Nineteen psychology undergraduates (16 females, aged 19-34) participated to 
provide data for a class exercise. All were native Turkish speakers, with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and hearing, and no knowledge of Japanese. The mean trait anxiety (Öner & 
LeCompte, 1985; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) was 41.16 (SD = 9.03).  
Design. A repeated measures design was used, with WM load (high: 5 items; low: 1 item) 
and probe position (probe replaces threat CS+; probe replaces non-threat CS-) as factors, and 
response time as the dependent variable. 
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Apparatus and Materials. The experiment was run using E-Prime, and a 17” CRT monitor. 
Twenty-four Japanese kanji characters were taken from KanjiLearn 
(http://www2.gol.com/users/jpc/Japan/Kanji/KanjiLearn/) to serve as conditioned stimuli 
(CS). The unconditioned stimulus (US) was a 1000ms, 9100Hz tone at 92dBA, delivered via 
headphones.  
Procedure. Participants completed a high load and a low load block, in a counterbalanced 
order. Each block included a conditioning phase and a dot probe phase.  
During the conditioning phase, participants passively viewed 12 randomly-selected kanji 
for one second each, each followed by a two-second pause. Four kanji were randomly-selected 
as CS+, and were followed by the US; the remainder were CS-. During the dot probe phase, 
participants completed dot probe and WM tasks simultaneously. The WM study stimuli were 
presented (5 digits for 2000ms in the high load block, 1 digit for 500ms in the low load block), 
then masked with an “X” (2500ms for the high load block, 750ms for the low load block). 
Timing varied between conditions to equate encoding difficulty (Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & 
Viding, 2004).  
Following a 1000ms fixation, one CS+ and one CS- were presented on the left and right 
sides of the screen for 750ms, followed by a small dot probe, which appeared in the position 
previously occupied by either the CS+ or the CS-. Participants pressed the Z key if the probe 
appeared on the left of the screen, and M if it appeared on the right, as quickly as possible. 
CS+ and probe position were randomised. A single digit was then presented: if this digit ap-
peared in the WM study stimulus, participants pressed Z, otherwise they pressed M. A new 
digit was presented on 50% of trials. Thirty-two trials were presented in each load block. 
Results 
Response times were retained if participants responded correctly to both the dot probe and 
the subsequent WM stimulus. A 2 (high vs. low load) × 2 (probe replaces CS+ vs. CS-) re-
peated measures ANOVA revealed a significant interaction, F(1,18) = 5.46, η2p = .23, p = .03, 
see Figure 1. As predicted, participants showed significant bias for threat under high load, 
t(18) = 1.89, p = .04 (one-tailed), and non-significant bias away from threat under low load, 
t(18) = -1.57, p = .07. The main effects of load and probe position were not significant (F’s < 
.05).  
Discussion 
As predicted, WM load affected attention allocation to threat. Participants showed non-
significant bias away from threat under low load (this is not unexpected, see Bar-Haim et al., 
 10 
2007), and started to show bias towards threat under high load. This raises the possibility that 
attentional biases shown by anxious participants may be partially attributable to general WM 
deficits, rather than purely reflecting differences in threat processing.  
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we sought to extend the findings of Experiment 1 in three ways. Firstly, 
we wished to replicate our findings using a different threat stimulus (schematic angry faces). 
Secondly, we wished to test whether WM load elicited attentional bias specifically to threats, 
or a more general bias to any emotional stimulus, and therefore the dot-probe task now includ-
ed happy faces. Finally, the digit load used in Experiment 1 could be considered a phonologi-
cal WM load (Baddeley, 1992); we wanted to see whether a visuo-spatial WM load would 
elicit attentional bias in the same way.  
Method 
Participants. Thirty-seven undergraduates (17 females, aged 18-26; M = 20.41, SD = 1.91) 
participated for 10 Turkish Lira. All were native Turkish speakers with normal vision. Mean 
trait anxiety was 41.35 (SD = 11.73).  
Design. A repeated measures design was used, with WM load (high: 3 items; low: 1 item), 
valence of the emotional face (angry; happy) and probe position (probe replaces emotion-
al/neutral face) as factors, and response time as the dependent variable.  
Apparatus and Materials. The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1. Pictures of an-
gry, happy and neutral schematic faces were taken from Hietanen and Lappänen (2003).  
Procedure. Participants completed high load and low load blocks in a counterbalanced or-
der. In this experiment, there was only a dot probe phase. After a 500ms fixation cross, partic-
ipants were presented with one emotional (happy or angry) and one neutral face, at the top and 
bottom of the screen for 100ms. These were followed by the cue, which took the form of a 
small arrow (< or >). The arrow replaced either the emotional face or the neutral face; posi-
tions of the emotional face (top or bottom of the screen) and the probe (emotional face’s loca-
tion or neutral face’s location) were counterbalanced. Participants indicated with a key-press, 
as fast as possible, the direction in which the arrow was pointing.  
As in Experiment 1, participants also completed a WM task at the same time as the dot 
probe. Before each dot probe trial, participants were presented with a 4 × 4 matrix of squares. 
In the high load condition, a series of three randomly-determined squares turned red for 
1000ms each, with a 500ms interval between squares. Participants were asked to remember 
which squares had turned red. Following their response to the dot probe, participants again 
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saw the matrix, with a single square coloured; they were asked to indicate with a key-press 
whether that square had turned red before the dot probe trial. A new square was presented on 
50% of trials. The low load condition was identical, except that only one square turned red 
before the dot probe. Visuo-spatial WM load was therefore three items in the high load condi-
tion and one item in the low load condition.  
Results 
A 2 (high vs. low load) × 2 (emotional face is angry vs. happy) ×  2 (probe replaces emo-
tional face vs. neutral face) repeated measures ANOVA revealed that participants showed 
more attentional bias toward emotional faces under high load than they did under low load, 
F(1,36) = 7.99, η2p = .18, p = .01. Simple main effects indicated that participants did not show 
attentional bias to emotional faces under low load, F(1,36) = 1.24, η2p = .03, p = .27, but 
showed significant bias under high load, F(1,36) = 7.81, η2p = .18, p = .01. However, this ef-
fect was not significantly different for angry vs. happy faces, as indicated by a non-significant 
three-way interaction, F(1,36) = 1.09, η2p = .03, p = .30. See Figure 2.  
Aside from a tendency to respond more slowly under high load, F(1,36) = 3.30, η2p = .08, p 
= .08, no other effects approached significance, all Fs < 2.57, all ps > .11.  
Discussion 
Again, the application of a WM load created an attentional bias toward emotional stimuli, 
where such a bias was not otherwise apparent. Here, we showed that both a phonological and a 
visuo-spatial WM load can have this effect, and the resulting bias is not restricted to fear-
conditioned threat stimuli. However, the attentional bias elicited by WM load was not specific 
to threat, but seemed to generalise to emotional stimuli of both positive and negative valence.  
It is not clear why WM’s effect on bias did not vary between happy and angry faces. Previ-
ous studies have occasionally found attentional bias to both negative and positive stimuli in 
anxiety (e.g. Fox et al., 2002); it could be assumed that a smiling face might be interpreted as 
contemptuous or mocking by an anxious individual, or that a happy face is threatening to an 
anxious individual because it reminds them that they are not happy. Neither of these accounts 
fit the present data, which were not collected from especially high-anxious participants. It 
could simply be that WM load increases attention allocation to all emotionally-salient stimuli. 
If this is true, the fact that similarly non-specific biases to emotional stimuli are also found in 
anxiety again suggests that attentional bias is not purely a function of threat-processing. In-
stead, this occurrence may be partially attributable to general cognitive control deficit com-
mon in anxious individuals (Eysenck et al., 2007).  
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Another possible account of these data is that WM load increased attention to more novel 
stimuli, rather than to emotional stimuli. In this experiment, the emotional stimulus varied 
unpredictably between an angry and a happy face, whereas the neutral stimulus was always 
the same neutral face. We accept this possibility. However, in Experiment 1 the emotional 
CS+ and neutral CS- changed on every trial, yet WM load still elicited an attentional bias to-
ward the CS+. Given the results of Experiment 1, we interpret those of Experiment 2 as re-
flecting a bias toward emotional, rather than novel, stimuli. 
General Discussion 
In two experiments, WM load was seen to elicit an attentional bias to emotional stimuli. At-
tentional bias is considered a hallmark of anxiety, and has been observed in several anxiety 
disorders (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Williams et al., 1997). However, the participants in the pre-
sent experiments were not selected for anxiety, so their showing attentional bias would not be 
predicted by extant theories of cognition in anxiety (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997). The present results prompt a re-conceptualisation of 
attentional bias, as resulting from an interaction between emotion-specific information pro-
cessing and more cognitive control. Future research must continue to probe the relationships 
between WM, cognitive control, and other cognitive biases in anxiety. 
One alternative account of the results is to suggest that the WM loads we applied, as they 
involved assessment of participants’ performance on a difficult task, increased the partici-
pants’ state anxiety, and that this state anxiety was responsible for the increase in bias. We 
accept this possibility, but doubt its veracity for two reasons. Firstly, we have conducted sev-
eral experiments involving WM loads with this participant group, and participants tend to 
complain of boredom during such experiments, rather than distress. Secondly, studies have not 
clearly demonstrated that state anxiety increases bias in the same way that trait anxiety does 
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007), particularly in unselected samples such as these (Egloff & Hock, 
2001). The fact that WM load has yielded consistent effects in these two relatively small sam-
ples leads us to conclude that the WM load affected our participants’ cognitive control ability, 
and did not directly affect their anxiety levels.  
Our findings are important because the assumption that anxious people process threats dif-
ferently is dominant in extant theories of anxiety, and especially in currently-developing 
treatments such as cognitive bias modification. The current results suggest that more general 
cognitive deficits in anxiety may be equally important for understanding the condition. 
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